REVERSED
1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte deVry 11/280,567 WARREN 103(a) ROHM AND HAAS COMPANY EXAMINER RIOJA, MELISSA A
3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Cereghini et al 10/378,682 MOHANTY 102(e) JAMES M. STOVER TERA DATA CORPORATION EXAMINER MANSFIELD, THOMAS L
Ex Parte Estrada et al 10/731,823 LORIN 102(e)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP STEVEN M. GREENBERG EXAMINER OUELLETTE, JONATHAN P
The law in the area of patent-eligible subject matter for process claims has recently been clarified by the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, No. 08-964, 2010 WL 2555192 (U.S. June 28, 2010). The Court held that the term “process” as used in § 101, does not categorically exclude business methods. Id. at *9.
The Court is unaware of any argument that the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,” Diehr, supra, at 182, of “method” excludes business methods. Nor is it clear how far a prohibition on business patents would reach, and whether it would exclude technologies for conducting a business more efficiently. “
At the same time, some business method patents raise special problems in terms of vagueness and suspect validity.” Id. (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006)) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In searching for a limiting principle, this Court’s precedents on the unpatentibility of abstract ideas provide useful tools. See infra 12-15. Indeed, if the Court of Appeals were to succeed in defining a narrower category or class of patent applications that claim to instruct how business should be conducted, and then rule that the category is unpatentable because, for instance, it represents an attempt to patent abstract ideas, this conclusion might well be in accord with controlling precedent. Id.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 USPQ 1 (1981) . . 2106, 2106.01, 2106.02, 2107.01
Ex Parte Feinberg 09/785,095 FISCHETTI 103(a) LERNER, DAVID, LITTENBERG,
KRUMHOLZ & MENTLIK EXAMINER ALVAREZ, RAQUEL
Ex Parte Stein et al 10/415,206 FISCHETTI 103(a)/112(1) 112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. Examiner Name: SHRESTHA, BIJENDRA K
35 U.S.C. 112, First Paragraph Enablement
By analogy, suppose that an inventor created a particular fuel-efficient automobile engine and described the engine in such detail in the specification that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to build the engine. Although the specification would meet the requirements of section 112 with respect to a claim directed to that particular engine, it would not necessarily support a broad claim to every possible type of fuel-efficient engine, no matter how different in structure or operation from the inventor's engine. The single embodiment would support such a generic claim only if the specification would "reasonably convey to a person skilled in the art that [the inventor] had possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of filing," Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and would "enable one of ordinary skill to practice ‘the full scope of the claimed invention,’" Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004), quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996). To hold otherwise would violate the Supreme Court's directive that "[i]t seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and the public, than that the former should understand, and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a patent." Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1876); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 ("The patent system is based on the proposition that the claims cover only the invented subject matter."); AK Steel Corp., 344 F.3d at 1244 ("as part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant's specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention"). Thus, a patentee cannot always satisfy the requirements of section 112, in supporting expansive claim language, merely by clearly describing one embodiment of the thing claimed. For that reason, we hold that the description of one method for creating a seamless DWT does not entitle the inventor of the ′835 patent to claim any and all means for achieving that objective. See, LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344-1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Chiron v. Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 70 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2164.03, 2164.05(a)
Wright, In re, 999 F.2d 1557, 27 USPQ2d 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . 2107.01, 2164.03, 2164.01(a), 2164.04, 2164.05(a), 2164.06(b), 2164.08
PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 48 USPQ2d 1351 (Fed. Cir.1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03, 2163
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . 2111, 2111.01, 2143.01, 2258
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 68 USPQ2d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . 2111.03, 2163, 2164.08
Lizard Tech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 76 USPQ2d 1724 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . .2163
3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
Ex Parte Freyman et al 10/645,653 McCARTHY 103(a) VIDAS, ARRETT & STEINKRAUS, P.A. EXAMINER WITCZAK, CATHERINE
Ex Parte Talya et al 10/813,720 BAHR 102(b)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (PCPI) C/O FLETCHER YODER EXAMINER VERDIER, CHRISTOPHER M
REEXAMINATION
EXAMINER AFFIRMED-IN-PART
3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU) Original Art Unit 2736
Ex parte TYCO SAFETY PRODUCTS CANADA, LTD. 90/010,071 5,923,250 TORCZON 103(a)Joseph E. Palys, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, for appellant H. Wayne Porter, BANNER &WITCOFF, LTD., for the reexamination requester EXAMINER DEB, ANJAN K
NEW
REVERSED
Ex Parte Cereghini et al
Ex Parte COLVIG et al
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
Ex Parte Bahl et al
Ex Parte Brock
AFFIRMED
Ex Parte Call
Ex Parte Duvert et al
Ex Parte Galli et al
Ex Parte Gradl
Ex Parte Hollmann et al
Ex Parte Huang
Ex Parte Iwai et al
Ex Parte Kelly et al
Ex Parte Khan
Ex Parte Mohammadi et al
Ex Parte Monnerie et al
Ex Parte Oppermann et al
Ex Parte Pourheidari
Ex Parte Shitara et al
Ex Parte Wechter et al
Ex Parte Westmijze et al
Ex Parte Zhong et al
REHEARING
Ex Parte Willis
