1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Davis et al GRIMES 103(a) SABIC INNOVATIVE PLASTICS
Ex Parte Nagashima et al ADAMS 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAN MAIER & NEUSTADT, P.C.
“We must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Further, it is the “facts appearing in the record, rather than prior decisions in and of themselves, which must support the legal conclusion of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” In re Cofer, 354 F.2d 664, 667 (CCPA 1966).
Ex Parte Furukawa et al LANE 103(a) WENDEROTH, LIND & PONACK, LLP
2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Kolb et al BLANKENSHIP 102(b) FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNERLLP
Ex Parte Barsness et al BLANKENSHIP 103(a) MARTIN & ASSOCIATES, LLC
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Piepho et al BLANKENSHIP 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Rozet et al HAIRSTON 103(a) Perman & Green, L.L.P.
3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Boczar et al HORNER 102(b)/103(a) CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
Ex Parte Gargi LORIN 102(a)/103(a)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
When there is insufficient description of an algorithm in the Specification to support a computer-enabled means-plus-function limitation in a claim, the disclosure will be considered inadequate to explain to one of ordinary skill in the art what is meant by the claim language.
For computer-implemented means-plus-function claims where the disclosed structure is a computer programmed to implement an algorithm, “the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed.Cir.1999). Thus the patent must disclose, at least to the satisfaction of one of ordinary skill in the art, enough of an algorithm to provide the necessary structure under § 112, ¶ 6. This court permits a patentee to express that algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, see In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245-46 (CCPA 1978), or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure. [new ¶] The district court correctly determined that the structure recited in the ′505 specification does not even meet the minimal disclosure necessary to make the claims definite. Simply reciting “software” without providing some detail about the means to accomplish the function is not enough. See Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, ---- (Fed. Cir. 2008)(“For a patentee to claim a means for performing a particular function and then to disclose only a general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform that function amounts to pure functional claiming. Because general purpose computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very different ways, simply disclosing a computer as the structure designated to perform a particular function does not limit the scope of the claim to ‘the corresponding structure, material, or acts' that perform the function, as required by section 112 paragraph 6.”). This court does not impose a lofty standard in its indefiniteness cases. See, e.g., Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But in this case, the claims are already quite vague. Without any corresponding structure, one of skill simply cannot perceive the bounds of the invention.
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Ex Parte Matsuno MEDLEY 102(b) MCGINN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP, PLLC
3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Pennell et al PATE, III 102(e)/103(a) FISH & RICHARDSON PC
Ex Parte Morgenstern et al GRIMES 103(a) LAW OFFICES OF ERIC KARICH
Ex Parte Lessard et al SCHEINER 102(b)/103(a) BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Johnson et al MOHANTY 102(b)/103(a) JOHN F. LETCHFORD, ARCHER & GREINER, P.C.
3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Bell et al SCHEINER 102(b)/103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC. CATHERINE E. WOLF
Claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art on structural grounds. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Merely stating an intended use for an apparatus is not sufficient to distinguish the apparatus from the prior art. In re Sinex, 309 F.2d 488, 492 (CCPA 1962).
