REVERSED
1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Lingappa et al ADAMS 103(a) QUINE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP, P.C.
Ex Parte Baron ADAMS 103(a) Licata & Tyrrell P.C.
[P]rior art fails to provide the requisite "reasonable expectation" of success where it teaches merely to pursue a "general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it." Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
Ex Parte Slowey et al PRATS 103(a) 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES COMPANY
When evaluating claims for obviousness, “the prior art as a whole must be considered. The teachings are to be viewed as they would have been viewed by one of ordinary skill.” In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, “‘[i]t is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position, to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one of ordinary skill in the art.’” Id. (quoting In re Wesslau, 353 F.2d 238, 241 (CCPA 1965)).
1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte McGuire et al FRANKLIN 103(a) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
Ex Parte Rudas TIMM 103(a) DUANE MORRIS LLP
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Leung et al DIXON 103(a) WEAVER AUSTIN VILLENEUVE & SAMPSON LLP
Ex Parte Blakley et al THOMAS 103(a) IBM CORP. (DHJ) c/o DAVID H. JUDSON
2600 Communications
Ex Parte Simpson et al SAADAT 102(b)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
Ex Parte Lay et al HOFF 102(b) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Feudel et al RUGGIERO 102(b)/103(a) WILLIAMS, MORGAN & AMERSON
Ex Parte Meinherz KRATZ 102(b) LERNER GREENBERG STEMER LLP
Ex Parte Miyazawa SMITH 102(e)/103(a) CROWELL & MORING LLP
3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Nilsson PATE, III 103(a) MARK P. STONE
Ex Parte Hanson et al HORNER 102(b)/103(a) GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN
Ex Parte Onishi HORNER 102(b) MURAMATSU & ASSOCIATES
Ex Parte Scherer MEDLEY 102(b)/103(a) WOODS FULLER SHULTZ & SMITH P.C.
3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Wilkins STAICOVICI 102(b)/103(a) IRA S. DORMAN
Ex Parte Hagan et al BARRETT 103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
Ex Parte Smith et al ADAMS 102(b)/103(a) NOVARTIS
Ex Parte Van Gompel et al ADAMS 103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.
Ex Parte Kuen et al PRATS 103(a) CHRISTOPHER M. GOFF (27839) ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Burns et al SMITH 102(b)/103(a) BARRY L. KELMACHTER BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C.
2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Sagar COURTENAY 102(e)/103(a) PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Almstrand et al HAIRSTON 103(a) ROGITZ & ASSOCIATES
Ex Parte Juels et al DIXON 102(e)/103(a) Ryan, Mason & Lewis, LLP
2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Arnold NAPPI 102(b)/103(a) MACMILLAN SOBANSKI & TODD, LLC
3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Norsworthy et al CRAWFORD 102(e)/103(a) K&L Gates LLP
While the specification can be examined for proper context of a claim term, limitations from the specification will not be imported into the claims. CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Ex Parte Wilson O’NEILL 102(b) WILMERHALE/BOSTON
3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Shelton LEBOVITZ 102(b)/103(a) HENRICKS SLAVIN AND HOLMES, LLP ADVANCED BIONICS CORPORATION
Ex Parte Hagan et al BARRETT 102(b)/102(e)/103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
Ex Parte Sakamoto PRATS 103(a) CARL SAKAMOTO
"[W]hile ‘the specification [should be used] to interpret the meaning of a claim,’ courts must not ‘import[ ] limitations from the specification into the claim.’ . . . [I]t is improper to ‘confin[e] the claims to th[e] embodiments’ found in the specification . . . ." In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), citations omitted, bracketed text in internal quotes in original); see also Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[W]hile it is true that claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification and with a view to ascertaining the invention, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims."); In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Absent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should onlylimit the claim based on the specification . . . when [it] expressly disclaim[s] the broader definition.").
