REVERSED
1633 Ex Parte Thastrup et al 10/072,036 GREEN 102(b)/103(a)/112(1) Workman Nydegger EXAMINER BURKHART, MICHAEL D
1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1798 Ex Parte Desai et al 10/288,126 TIMM 112(1)/102(e)/102(b)/103(a)/112(1) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY EXAMINER COLE, ELIZABETH M
2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2183 Ex Parte Cabillic et al 11/186,036 JEFFERY 112(1)/102(b)/103(a) TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED EXAMINER FAHERTY, COREY S
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2424 Ex Parte Kim 10/216,875 BAUMEISTER 102(b)/112(1) 112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) SUGHRUE MION, PLLC EXAMINER SHANG, ANNAN Q
2451 Ex Parte McDougall et al 10/284,966 MacDONALD 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER DIVECHA, KAMAL B
2600 Communications
2629 Ex Parte Lilleness et al 10/287,337 KRIVAK 102(b)/103(a) GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP (CHI) EXAMINER PHAM, TAMMY T
2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
2876 Ex Parte Robinson et al 11/265,364 MANTIS MERCADER 102(e)/102(b)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER SHARIFZADA, ALI R
AFFIRMED
1654 Ex Parte Krafft et al 11/100,212 GRIMES 102(b) Jane Massey Licata, Esquire Licata & Tyrrell P.C. EXAMINER GUPTA, ANISH
2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2175 Ex Parte Muller et al 11/040,270 COURTENAY 102(b) CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP EXAMINER TANK, ANDREW L
We also broadly but reasonably construe the “configured to render an arrangement . . . .” language of claim 1 as a statement of intended use or purpose. (emphasis added) “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim's preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id.
Stencel, In re, 828 F.2d 751, 4 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2111.02
...
See In re Jung, No. 2010-1019, 2011 WL 1235093 at 7 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(“Jung argues that the Board gave improper deference to the examiner’s rejection by requiring Jung to‘identif[y] a reversible error’ by the examiner, which improperly shifted the burden of proving patentability onto Jung. Decision at 11. This is a hollow argument, because, as discussed above, the examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation and the burden was properly shifted to Jung to rebut it. . . . ‘[R]eversible error’ means that the applicant must identify to the Board what the examiner did wrong . . . .”).
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2432 Ex Parte Wang et al 10/026,043 MacDONALD 103(a) MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC. EXAMINER KIM, JUNG W
2600 Communications
2612 Ex Parte Lindskog 10/502,018 SAADAT 103(a) Mark P. Stone EXAMINER NGUYEN, NAM V
3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3721 Ex Parte Bodine et al 10/943,795 O’NEILL 103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C. EXAMINER DURAND, PAUL R
Objective evidence of non-obviousness, including commercial success, must be commensurate in scope with the claims. In re Tiffin, 448 F.2d 791 (CCPA 197 1) (evidence showing commercial success of thermoplastic foam “cups” used in vending machines was not commensurate in scope with claims directed to thermoplastic foam “containers” broadly). In order to be commensurate in scope with the claims, the commercial success must be due to claimed features, and not due to unclaimed features. Joy Technologies Inc. v. Manbeck, 751 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 226, 228 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Features responsible for commercial success were recited only in allowed dependent claims, and therefore the evidence of commercial success was not commensurate in scope with the broad claims at issue.). An inventor’s opinion as to the purchaser’s reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus between the sales and the claimed invention. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Further, gross sales figures do not show commercial success absent evidence as to market share, Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985), or as to the time period during which the product was sold, or as to what sales would normally be expected in the market, Ex parte Standish, 10 USPQ2d 1454, 1458 (BPAI 1988).
Tiffin, In re, 443 F.2d 394, 170 USPQ 88 (CCPA 1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 716.04, 2142
Joy Technologies Inc. v. Manbeck, 751 F. Supp 225, 17 USPQ2d 1257 (D.D.C. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . .716.03(a)
Huang, In re, 100 F.3d 135, 40 USPQ2d 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996) . . . . 716.03, 716.03(b), 2145
Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 226 USPQ 881 (Fed. Cir. 1985) . . . . 716.03(b), 716.06, 1504.03
Standish, Ex parte, 10 USPQ2d 1454 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) .716.03(a), 716.03(b), 2138.01
3738 Ex Parte Calandruccio et al 10/842,030 BAHR 103(a) WRIGHT MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, INC. EXAMINER PRONE, CHRISTOPHER D
3772 Ex Parte Masini 10/872,717 O’NEILL 112(1)/102(e)/102(b)/103(a) GIFFORD, KRASS, SPRINKLE, ANDERSON & CITKOWSKI, P.C EXAMINER PATEL, TARLA R
[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. . . . [T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed. . . . This inquiry . . . is a question of fact.
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). See also Vas-Cath at 1563-64.
New or amended claims which introduce elements or limitations which are not supported by the as-filed disclosure violate the written description requirement. Written description support can be either express or inherent, and is determined from the disclosure considered as a whole. Reiffin v. Microsoft, 214 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000). That one of ordinary skill in the art might see the scenario asserted by Appellant as possible within the context of the description in Appellant’s Specification is insufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and In re Wohnsiedler, 315 F.2d 934, 937 (CCPA 1963). See also In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 (CCPA 1977):
That a person skilled in the art might realize from reading the disclosure that such a step is possible is not a sufficient indication to that person that [the] step is part of appellants’ invention. Such an indication is the least that is required for a description of the invention under the first paragraph of § 112.
Precisely how close the original description must come to comply with the description requirement must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The primary consideration is factual and depends on the nature of the invention and the amount of knowledge imparted to those skilled in the art by the disclosure. See Vas-Cath at 1561-63.
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 USPQ2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991). . .1504.20, 2161, 2163, 2163.02, 2164, 2181
Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1505, 41 USPQ2d 1961 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . 2133.03(a), 2163, 2163.02
Barker, In re, 559 F.2d 588, 194 USPQ 470 (CCPA 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2161, 2163
