moncla, broadcom, ventana, martek, arlington, curtiss-wright, Phillips, ngai, king

REVERSED

1735 Ex Parte Ozkan et al 11/410,267 OWENS 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 112(1) DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP EXAMINER POLYANSKY, ALEXANDER

2111 Ex Parte Fischer et al 10/942,351 NAPPI 102(e)/103(a) MISSION/BSTZ BLAKELY SOKOLOFF TAYLOR & ZAFMAN LLP EXAMINER CLEARY, THOMAS J

2163 Ex Parte Feinberg 11/033,646 JEFFERY 102(e)/103(a) WORKMAN NYDEGGER/MICROSOFT EXAMINER LEE, WILSON

2187 Ex Parte Kallahalla et al 10/959,536 BARRY 103(a)/non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER CYGIEL, GARY W

When all other rejections on appeal have been reversed, and the only remaining rejection is a provisional non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection, it is premature to address the provisional rejection. Ex Parte Moncla, 95 USPQ2d 1884, 1885 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1648 Ex Parte Wolff et al 11/828,272 GRIMES 102(b)/112(1) FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. EXAMINER PARKIN, JEFFREY S

1731 Ex Parte Wanninger et al 10/058,832 GAUDETTE 102(b)/103(a) VENABLE LLP EXAMINER FELTON, AILEEN BAKER

“[E]ach claim does not necessarily cover every feature disclosed in the specification. When the claim addresses only some of the features disclosed in the specification, it is improper to limit the claim to other, unclaimed features.” Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 689 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); see also, Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[E]ven where a patent describes only a single embodiment, claims will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words of expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.”). Substantive differences between the claims “can be a ‘useful guide in understanding the meaning of particular claim terms.’” Arlington Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc. 632 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also, Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[C]laim differentiation takes on relevance in the context of a claim construction that would render additional, or different, language in another independent claim superfluous.”).

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . 2111, 2111.01, 2143.01, 2258

3623 Ex Parte Schroeder et al 10/302,406 KIM 102(b)/103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC. EXAMINER BOSWELL, BETH V

3654 Ex Parte Szentistvany 10/524,122 BARRETT 103(a) Larson & Anderson, LLC EXAMINER KRUER, STEFAN

3738 Ex Parte McCarthy et al 11/106,421 GREENHUT 102(e)/103(a) EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORPORATION EXAMINER MILLER, CHERYL L
AFFIRMED

1736 Ex Parte Jones et al 10/582,593 GAUDETTE 103(a) Albemarle Netherlands B.V. EXAMINER WALCK, BRIAN D

2128 Ex Parte Ould-Brahim 10/747,967 HUGHES 102(e)/102(b) RIDOUT & MAYBEE LLP EXAMINER SILVER, DAVID

2617 Ex Parte Stephens 10/875,753 NAPPI 103(a) Thorpe North & Western LLP c/o CPA Global EXAMINER BRANDT, CHRISTOPHER M

3761 Ex Parte Long et al 11/511,573 GREENHUT 102(b) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC. EXAMINER KIDWELL, MICHELE M

First, Appellants are not entitled to patent a known product by simply attaching a set of instructions to that product. In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); See also, King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Ngai, In re, 367 F.3d 1336, 70 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . 2106.01, 2112.01