REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1777 Ex Parte Cox et al 11/428,289 OWENS 103(a) HONEYWELL/STW EXAMINER XU, XIAOYUN

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3775 Ex Parte Schmieding 10/638,489 ADAMS 103(a) DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP EXAMINER RAMANA, ANURADHA

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3784 Ex Parte Lifson et al 10/829,744 HORNER 102(b)/103(a) CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C. EXAMINER ALI, MOHAMMAD M

REEXAMINATION

EXAMINER AFFIRMED

3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU)
2164 Ex parte PRESENTATION SPECIALIST TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 90/008,957 6,453,302 EASTHOM 112(2)/102(b)/102(e)/103(a) Hershkovitz & Associates, LLC EXAMINER STEELMAN, MARY J original EXAMINER POINVIL, FRANTZY

This mental image producing result does not constitute a patentable distinction. Rather, it constitutes nonfunctional descriptive material. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a “functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate” for claim language to impart patentability) (quoting In re Gulack, 703, F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); accord In re Bryan, 323 Fed. Appx. 898 (nonprecedential) (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“the substance of the printed matter . . . cannot impart patentability, as it is ‘useful and intelligible only to the human mind’” (quoting In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983).)

Ngai, In re, 367 F.3d 1336, 70 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . 2106.01, 2112.01

Gulack, In re, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . .2106.01, 2112.01

Lowry, In re, 32 F.3d 1579, 32 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2106.01

AFFIRMED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1784 Ex Parte Warrier et al 10/702,010 TIMM dissent NAGUMO 112(1) CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C. EXAMINER ZIMMERMAN, JOHN J

1783 Ex Parte Sjoberg 10/477,141 FRANKLIN 103(a) NOVAK, DRUCE, & QUIGG, LLP – PERGO EXAMINER SIMONE, CATHERINE A

2471 Ex Parte Vasudevan et al 10/001,296 SAADAT 103(a) CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Alcatel-Lucent EXAMINER WONG, WARNER

2600 Communications
2628 Ex Parte Brunner et al 10/877,358 MARTIN 103(a) WONG, CABELLO, LUTSCH, RUTHERFORD & BRUCCULERI LLP EXAMINER WASHBURN, DANIEL C

2612 Ex Parte Castle et al 11/094,759 HOFF 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER KHAN, OMER S

REISSUE

AFFIRMED

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2478 Ex Parte Riddle 10/857,799 5,999,977 JEFFERY 251 APPLE/FENWICK EXAMINER LIN, KENNY S

Section 251 governs reissuing defective patents “deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid . . . by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 251, ¶ 1. Although this statute is “remedial in nature,” and “based on fundamental principles of equity and fairness, . . . not every event or circumstance that might be labelled ‘error’ is correctable by reissue.” In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Notably, the statute mandates that “[n]o reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 251, ¶ 4 (emphasis added).

This two-year limit codifies a long-standing equitable doctrine of laches applied to broadening reissue applications,7 and ensures that the public is timely notified of the intention to broaden patented claims. See In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Notice is critical since the potential expansion of the patentee’s patent rights via reissue likewise affects the public’s rights in an increased likelihood of infringing that expanded scope, notwithstanding the intervening rights provisions of § 252. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271 and 252. The reissue statute therefore “balances the purpose of providing the patentee with an opportunity to correct errors of inadequate claim scope, with the public interest in finality and certainty of patent rights.” Graff, 111 F.3d at 877 (citation omitted). As such, the “public is entitled to rely on the absence of a broadening reissue application within two years of grant of the original patent.” Id.

7 P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161, 205 (1993).

Graff, In re, 111 F.3d 874, 42 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . 1403, 1412.03, 1451