gurley, para-ordnance, harza, freeman,

REVERSED 

2100 Computer Architecture and Software 

Ex Parte Koh et al 09/802,857 THOMAS 103(a)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) RADER FISHMAN & GRAUER PLLC EXAMINER YIGDALL, MICHAEL J 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART 

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry 

Ex Parte Guglielmotti et al 10/560,836 WALSH 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. EXAMINER RAMACHANDRAN, UMAMAHESWARI Ex Parte Shy 11/123,360 WALSH 103(a) STINSON MORRISON HECKER LLP 

See Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553; see also, Para-Ordnance Manufacturing v. SGS Importers International Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1090 (Fed Cir. 1995) (a warning against use of an element, rather than omission of mention of the element, is required to find teaching away). 

Gurley, In re, 27 F.3d 551, 31 USPQ2d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2123, 2145 

2100 Computer Architecture and Software 

Ex Parte Forman et al 10/835,684 HOMERE 101/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER SULLIVAN, DANIELLE D 

Ex Parte Nutter et al 10/145,374 FETTING 102(e)/103(a) LAW OFFICE OF DALE B. HALLING EXAMINER LE, MIRANDA 

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review 

Ex Parte Sharp 09/765,985 LORIN 103(a) 37 C.F.R. 41.50(b) KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP EXAMINER MITTAL, KRISHAN K 

Cf. In re Harza, 274 F.2d 669, 774 (CCPA 1960) ("It is well settled that the mere duplication of parts has no patentable significance unless a new and unexpected result is produced".) 

Harza, In re, 274 F.2d 669, 124 USPQ 378 (CCPA 1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2144.04 

REEXAMINATION 

3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU) 

Ex parte PBI PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, INC. 90/008,132 6,624,096 DELMENDO 103(a) FOR PATENT OWNER: HAMMER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., FOR THIRD-PARTY REQUESTER: MICHAEL F. SNYDER VOLPE AND KOENIG, P.C. EXAMINER TURNER, SHARON L 

Collateral estoppel (also called issue preclusion) “precludes relitigation in a second suit of issues actually litigated and determined in the first suit.” In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994). This doctrine applies only if: “(1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.” Id. 

Freeman, In re, 30 F.3d 1459, 31 USPQ2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1994). . . 706.03(w), 2250, 2666.01