REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Yu et al McKELVEY, TORCZON, concurring 102(e)/103(a) SUGHRUE MION, PLLC

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Culbert BAUMEISTER 102(e)/103(a) BEYER LAW GROUP LLP/APPLE INC.

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Griffin et al O’NEILL 112(2)/103(a) INTERNATIONAL ENGINE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPANY

Rejections based on 35 U.S.C. § 103 must rest on a factual basis. In making such a rejection, the Examiner has the initial duty of supplying the requisite factual basis and may not, because of doubts that the invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in the factual basis. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967).

Warner, In re, 379 F.2d 1011, 154 USPQ 173 (CCPA 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2142

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Vartiainen PATE III 103(a) RONALD L. GRUDZIECKI

“[T]he precise language of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that ‘(a) person shall be entitled to a patent unless,’ concerning novelty and unobviousness, clearly places a burden of proof on the Patent Office which requires it to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 and 103.” In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (CCPA 1967).

Warner, In re, 379 F.2d 1011, 154 USPQ 173 (CCPA 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2142

Ex Parte Wright et al LEBOVITZ 103(a) CALYPSO MEDICAL / PERKINS COIE, LLP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Iwata et al SIU 103(a) STAAS & HALSEY LLP

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Layton et al BAHR 102(b)/102(e)/103(a) EDWARD S. WRIGHT

Ex Parte Caunter O’NEILL 102(b)/103(a) DAVIDSON, DAVIDSON & KAPPEL, LLC

Further responding to Appellant’s entanglement allegation, “it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.” In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). It should be noted that “[c]ombining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973).

Sneed, In re, 710 F.2d 1544, 218 USPQ 385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1445, 2145

Keller, In re, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707.07(f) , 2145

Nievelt, In re, 482 F.2d 965, 179 USPQ 224 (CCPA 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2145