REVERSED

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Chamberlain et al COURTENAY 112(2)/102(b)/103(a) CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP

Ex Parte Van Der Linden et al BARRY 102(e)/103(a) IBM - SAWYER LAW GROUP LLP

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Ekl et al STEPHENS 102(b)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) MOTOROLA, INC

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Lee et al CRAWFORD 102(e)/103(a) Haynes and Boone, LLP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Manjeshwar et al McCARTHY 102(b)/obviousness-type double patenting/101 112(1) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) GENERAL ELECRIC COMPANY (PCPI) C/O FLETCHER YODER

The specification underlying a “single means” claim per se fails to enable the full scope of the claim. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

By its own terms, the sixth paragraph of § 112 limits the scope only of an element in a claim for a combination. A single means claim recites a structure having only a single element, not a combination of elements. The sixth paragraph of § 112 does not limit the scope of a claim reciting a structure comprising only one element, even if the element is recited as a “means” for performing a specified function. Without the limitation provided by the sixth paragraph of § 112, the “means” recited in a single means claim encompasses any structure which might be capable of performing the specified function. Since the disclosure of any specification will be limited to those means known by the inventor, no specification can be drawn sufficiently broadly to teach how to make and use the full scope of a single means claim. Id. at 715.

Hyatt, In re, 708 F.2d 712, 218 USPQ 195(Fed. Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2164.08(a), 2181