REVERSED

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Tomoike HAIRSTON 103(a) SUGHRUE MION, PLLC

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Frigg TIERNEY 102(b) Fay Kaplun & Marcin, LLP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Crew WALSH 112(1)/103(a) MCTAVISH PATENT FIRM

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Guo DELMENDO 103(a)/obviousness-type double patenting LINDA K. RUSSELL AIR LIQUIDE

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Meyer COLAIANNI 102(b)/103(a) STRIKER STRIKER & STENBY

Claims directed to an apparatus or device must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure. See In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 848 (CCPA 1959) (“Claims drawn to an apparatus must distinguish from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function”); In re Gardiner, 171 F.2d 313, 315-16 (CCPA 1948) (“It is trite to state that the patentability of apparatus claims must be shown in the structure claimed and not merely upon a use, function, or result thereof.”).

Danly, In re, 263 F.2d 844, 120 USPQ 528 (CCPA 1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2114

Ex Parte Rombach et al ROBERTSON 101/112(1)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. §41.50(b) MUIRHEAD AND SATUNELLI, LLC

In order to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the disclosed utility must be both substantial and specific. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). A substantial utility requires showing that the claimed invention “has a significant and presently available benefit to the public.” Id. A specific utility requires showing that “the claimed invention can be used to provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public.” Id.

Fisher, In re, 421 F.3d 1365, 76 USPQ2d1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . .. . . . . . . .2106, 2107.01

Ex Parte Vyvoda et al BOALICK 102(e)/103(a) BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Krawitz SPIEGEL 103(a) 37 C.F.R. 41.50(b) DILWORTH & BARRESE, LLP

It is a matter of obviousness for one of ordinary skill in the art to combine two or more materials, such as the known antioxidants disclosed by Kosbab, when each is taught by the prior art to be useful for the same purpose. Kerkhoven, 626 F.2d at 850; In re Crocket, 279 F.2d 274, 276-77 (CCPA 1960). Optimization of a known result-effective variable, such as concentration here, is generally obvious. Aller, 220 F.2d at 456.

Kerkhoven, In re, 626 F.2d 846, 205 USPQ 1069 (CCPA 1980). . . . . . . . . . 2144.06

Crockett, In re, 279 F.2d 274, 126 USPQ 186 (CCPA 1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2144.06

Aller, In re, 220 F.2d 454, 105 USPQ 233 (CCPA 1955). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2144.05

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Kuzyk ROBERTSON 103(a) DANN, DORFMAN, HERRELL & SKILLMAN

Ex Parte Kato et al ROBERTSON 103(a) BIRCH STEWART KOLASCH & BIRCH

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Juhler MARTIN 102(b)/103(a) BIRCH STEWART KOLASCH & BIRCH

The Examiner concluded that the term “foldable” in the preamble is merely a statement of intended use and thus entitled to no weight, citing In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67 (CCPA 1976) and Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150 (CCPA 1951). (Answer 5.) We agree with Appellant that Kropa supports the position that “foldable” is entitled to weight. The preamble in Kropa read, “An abrasive article comprising . . . .” The court held that these introductory words “are essential to point out the invention,” concluding that they “give life and meaning to the counts, for it is only by that phrase that it can be known that the subject matter defined by the claims is comprised as an abrasive article.” Id. at 152.

Hirao, In re, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15(CCPA 1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .707.07(f) , 2141.02

Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 88 USPQ 478 (CCPA 1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . 707.07(f) , 2111.02

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Buttner et al MARTIN 103(a) COHEN, PONTANI, LIEBERMAN & PAVANE LLP

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Sowul et al KERINS 102(b) LESLIE C. HODGES GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Bajaj McCARTHY 102(a)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) SONNENSCHEIN NATH & ROSENTHAL LLP

Ex Parte Kohlgruber KERINS 102(b)/103(a)/ obviousness-type double patenting NORRIS MCLAUGHLIN & MARCUS, PA

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Kabra PRATS 103(a) ALCON RESEARCH, LTD.

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Berkema et al HAHN 102(b)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

Ex Parte Smith et al NAPPI 112(1)/103(a) HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Priebe et al MILLS 103(a) MERCHANT & GOULD PC

Ex Parte Zakheim et al BAHR 102(b)/103(a) E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Abe et al WALSH 103(a) H. JAY SPIEGEL AND ASSOCIATES PC

Ex Parte Lee et al GRIMES 102(b)/103(a) PHILIP S. JOHNSON JOHNSON & JOHNSON

Ex Parte Tzertzinis et al PRATS 103(a) HARRIET M. STRIMPEL. D. PHIL. NEW ENGLAND BIOLABS, INC.

Moreover, “obviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a claim.” CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l. Corp. , 349 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (CCPA 1974)).

CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int ’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 68 USPQ2d 1940 (Fed. Cir. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2164

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Bodin et al THOMAS 103(a) INTERNATIONAL CORP (BLF) c/o BIGGERS & OHANIAN, LLP

Ex Parte Dettinger et al BARRETT 102(b)/103(a) IBM CORPORATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

Ex Parte Li LUCAS 102(e)/103(a) CHRISTOPHER C. WINSLADE MCANDREWS, HELD & MALLOY, LTD

Ex Parte Mishra et al HOMERE 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

A computer data signal embodied in a carrier wave is a transitory, propagating signal not within any of the four statutory categories and, therefore, non-statutory. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1357.

Nuitjen, In re, Docket No. 2006-1371 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2106

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Scott et al DIXON 102(e) DOREEN J. GRIDLEY ICE MILLER

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Johnson NAPPI 102(b)/103(a) LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC.

"[I]nterpreting what is meant by a word in a claim ‘is not to be confused with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which is improper.’" In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis in original).

Cruciferous Sprout Litig., In re, 301 F.3d 1343, 64 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . . 2111.02

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Chen et al FETTING 101/112(2)/103(a) HAYNES BEFFEL & WOLFELD LLP

The Examiner rejected the claims for failing to include necessary steps. The steps the Examiner found missing were the final replies back to the requesting process. Ans. 6-7. The Examiner cited to MPEP § 2172.01, which in turn cites In re Venezia, 530 F.2d 956 (CCPA 1976) and In re Collier, 397 F.2d 1003 (CCPA 1968).

The Appellants argue the steps that the Examiner found to be omitted were simply additional steps described, but not critical steps. App. Br. 7-8. We agree the Specification does not in any way suggest or describe the missing steps as critical to the operation of the claimed methods.

We point out for the benefit of the Examiner the citations in the MPEP following those above, Ex parte Nolden, 149 USPQ 378, 380 (Bd. Pat. App. 1965) ("[I]t is not essential to a patentable combination that there be interdependency between the elements of the claimed device or that all the elements operate concurrently toward the desired result") and Ex parte Huber, 148 USPQ 447, 448-49 (Bd. Pat. App. 1965) (“A claim does not necessarily fail to comply with 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph where the various elements do not function simultaneously, are not directly functionally related, do not directly intercooperate, and/or serve independent purposes.”), quoting MPEP 2172.01.

Venezia, In re, 530 F.2d 956, 189 USPQ 149 (CCPA 1976) . . . . . . . 2163, 2163.05, 2172.01, 2173.05(g)

Collier, In re, 397 F.2d 1003, 158 USPQ266 (CCPA 1968) . . . . . . . 2163, 2163.05, 2172.01,2173.05(k)

Nolden, Ex parte, 149 USPQ 378 (Bd. Pat. App. 1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2172.01

Huber, Ex parte, 148 USPQ 447 (Bd. Pat. App. 1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2172.01

Ex Parte Emerling et al HORNER 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) WOOD, HERRON & EVANS, LLP (LEAR)

A two-part test has been established for determining if the steps of a method claim that do not otherwise recite an order must nonetheless be performed in the order in which they are written. First, we look to the claim language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, the recited steps must be performed in the order written. “If not, we next look to the rest of the specification to determine whether it ‘directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction.”’ Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp. , 318 F.3d 1363, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc. , 256 F.3d 1323, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (emphasis in original). If not, the sequence in which such steps are written is not a requirement of the claim. Id.

Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 65 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003). . . 2111.01

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Fukasawa HAIRSTON 102(b)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) MARTINE PENILLA & GENCARELLA, L.L.P.

Ex Parte Mizuta et al NAPPI 103(a) MCGINN & GIBB, PLLC

Ex Parte Myers SAADAT 103(a) HEWLETT PACKARD COMPANY

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Nosaka et al HORNER 103(a) WOOD, PHILLIPS, VAN SANTEN, CLARK & MORTIMER

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Jenkins STAICOVICI 103(a) LEON D. ROSEN FREILICH, HORNBAKER & ROSEN

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Wang et al LEBOVITZ 103(a) BOZICEVIC, FIELD & FRANCIS LLP

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Beckhoff et al DANG 103(a) FAEGRE & BENSON LLP

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Skillas LEE 102(b)/103(a) WELSH & FLAXMAN LLC

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Siber ADAMS 102(b)/103(a) HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

In proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office, the Examiner bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness based upon the prior art. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1992). On appeal to this Board, Appellants must show that the Examiner has not sustained the required burden. See Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 USPQ2d 1606, 1608 and 1614 (BPAI 2008) (precedential); Ex parte Fu, 89 USPQ2d 1115, 1118 and 1123 (BPAI 2008) (precedential).

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Lewis et al HORNER 103(a) MR. STEPHEN E. BONDURA DORITY & MANNING, P.A.

Ex Parte Mori et al KERINS 102(b)/103(a) FRASER CLEMENS MARTIN & MILLER LLC

An appellant has the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s position. See Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 USPQ2d 1606, 1614 (BPAI 2008) (on appeal, applicant must show examiner erred); Ex parte Fu, 89 USPQ2d 1115, 1123 (BPAI 2008); Ex parte Catan, 83 USPQ2d 1569, 1577 (BPAI 2007); and Ex parte Smith, 83 USPQ2d 1509, 1519 (BPAI 2007).

Catan, Ex parte, 83 USPQ2d 1569 (Bd. Pat. App.& Int. 2007).. . . . . . . . . . . . 2143.01

Smith, Ex parte, 83 USPQ2d 1509 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2143

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte DiPoto McCARTHY 112(1)/102(e)/103(a) CROMPTON, SEAGER & TUFTE, LLC

“Although [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly the subject matter claimed, . . . the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the applicant] invented what is claimed” as of the filing date of the application. In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussing the written description requirement in the context of a claim of foreign priority).

Gosteli, In re, 872 F.2d 1008, 10 USPQ2d1614 (Fed. Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . 608.01(p), 715.03, 2131.02, 2136.05, 2163.02, 2163.03, 2163.05

The Examiner’s stated rationale for concluding that the subject matter of claims 10-17 would have been obvious resembles the holding of In re Gazda, 219 F.2d 449, 452 (CCPA 1955) (cited in MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2144.04(VI)(A)). Despite this resemblance, the Examiner has not made sufficient findings to show that Gazda supports the conclusion that the subject matter would have been obvious.

Gazda, In re, 219 F.2d 449, 104 USPQ 400 (CCPA 1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2144.04

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Yu et al McKELVEY, TORCZON, concurring 102(e)/103(a) SUGHRUE MION, PLLC

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Culbert BAUMEISTER 102(e)/103(a) BEYER LAW GROUP LLP/APPLE INC.

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Griffin et al O’NEILL 112(2)/103(a) INTERNATIONAL ENGINE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPANY

Rejections based on 35 U.S.C. § 103 must rest on a factual basis. In making such a rejection, the Examiner has the initial duty of supplying the requisite factual basis and may not, because of doubts that the invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in the factual basis. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967).

Warner, In re, 379 F.2d 1011, 154 USPQ 173 (CCPA 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2142

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Vartiainen PATE III 103(a) RONALD L. GRUDZIECKI

“[T]he precise language of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that ‘(a) person shall be entitled to a patent unless,’ concerning novelty and unobviousness, clearly places a burden of proof on the Patent Office which requires it to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 and 103.” In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (CCPA 1967).

Warner, In re, 379 F.2d 1011, 154 USPQ 173 (CCPA 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2142

Ex Parte Wright et al LEBOVITZ 103(a) CALYPSO MEDICAL / PERKINS COIE, LLP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Iwata et al SIU 103(a) STAAS & HALSEY LLP

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Layton et al BAHR 102(b)/102(e)/103(a) EDWARD S. WRIGHT

Ex Parte Caunter O’NEILL 102(b)/103(a) DAVIDSON, DAVIDSON & KAPPEL, LLC

Further responding to Appellant’s entanglement allegation, “it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.” In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). It should be noted that “[c]ombining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973).

Sneed, In re, 710 F.2d 1544, 218 USPQ 385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1445, 2145

Keller, In re, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707.07(f) , 2145

Nievelt, In re, 482 F.2d 965, 179 USPQ 224 (CCPA 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2145

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Dhindsa et al OWENS 103(a) BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Burdgick et al THOMAS 103(a) NIXON & VANDERHYE P.C.

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Sugimura PATE III 112(2)/103(a) PRICE HENEVELD COOPER DEWITT & LITTON, LLP

There is no legally recognizable essential gist or heart of the invention. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). All words in a claim must be considered in judging the obviousness of the claimed subject matter. See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385.

W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983). . . . 2132, 2133.03(a), 2133.03(c), 2141.01, 2141.02, 2144.08, 2164.08, 2165.04, 2173.05(b)

Wilson, In re, 424 F.2d 1382, 165 USPQ 494, (CCPA 1970).. . . . . . . . . . . .2143.03, 2173.06

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Packman et al LEE 103(a) BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C.

Ex Parte Picetti et al MILLS 102(b)/103(a)/112(1) MEDTRONIC

"[O]bviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a claim." CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (CCPA 1974)).

CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int ’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 68 USPQ2d 1940 (Fed. Cir. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2164

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Von Borstel et al GRIMES 112(1)/103(a) NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Russell HAIRSTON 102(b)/103(a) LARSON NEWMAN & ABEL LLP

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Miyazaki et al STAICOVICI 102(e) ERNEST A. BEUTLER, ATTORNEY AT LAW

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Perez STAICOVICI 102(b)/103(a) LEVINE BAGADE HAN LLP

REVERSED

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Jarvis et al BARRY 103(a) STMICROELECTRONICS, INC.

Ex Parte Kalan et al HOMERE 102(b) ROCKWELL AUTOMATION

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Ukigawa et al HAIRSTON 103(a)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) SUGHRUE MION, PLLC

Ex Parte Hall GREEN 102(b)/103(a) MICHAEL A. BLAKE, LLC

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Venkataraman GRIMES 103(a) DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP

“In determining whether obviousness is established by combining the teachings of the prior art, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted).

GPAC, In re, 57 F.3d 1573, 35 USPQ2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 716.03, 2145

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Smith SPIEGEL 103(a) CLARK & BRODY

In addition, one skilled in the art must be presumed to know something about the art apart from what the references disclose. In re Jacoby, 309 F.2d 513, 516 (CCPA 1962). Skill in the art is presumed. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1985). It is well settled that the prior art need not disclose the same purpose for a claimed method in order to establish its obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1990). All that is necessary is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had some reason for performing the claimed method step. In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, “[o]ne cannot use hindsight reconstruction to pick and choose among isolated disclosures in the prior art to deprecate the claimed invention.” In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Further, although § 103 does not define what is meant by "prior art,"

this determination is frequently couched in
terms of whether the art is analogous or not,
i.e., whether the art is "too remote to be treated
as prior art." In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741 . . .
(Fed. Cir. 1985).

. . . . . .
Two criteria have evolved for determining whether
prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from
the same field of endeavor, regardless of the
problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not
within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether
the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor is
involved. In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 . . . .
(Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036
(CCPA 1979)

Dillon, In re, 919 F.2d 688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2141, 2144, 2144.09, 2145

Fine, In re, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . 707.07(f) , 2143.01 , 2143.03 , 2144

Deminski, In re, 796 F.2d 436, 230 USPQ 313 (Fed. Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2141.01(a)

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Aoyama et al FETTING 101/102(a)/103(a) JACKSON WALKER LLP

Ex Parte Morgenstern et al HORNER 103(a)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) KOESTNER BERTANI LLP

See MPEP § 2144.03(B) (“[t]he examiner must provide specific factual findings predicated on sound technical and scientific reasoning to support his or her conclusion of common knowledge.”) (citing In re Soli, 317 F.2d 941, 946 (CCPA 1963) and In re Chevenard, 139 F.2d 711, 713 (CCPA 1943)).

Soli, In re, 317 F.2d 941, 137 USPQ 797 (CCPA 1963). . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .2144.02 , 2144.03

Chevenard, In re, 139 F.2d 71, 60 USPQ 239 (CCPA 1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2144.03

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte McGraw et al GREEN 102(b)/103(a)/ Obviousness-type Double Patenting BLANK ROME LLP

“We must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs. , 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Dihel et al WALSH 103(a) AKZO NOBEL INC.

A prima facie case of obviousness is made by presenting evidence that the "reference teachings would appear to be sufficient for one of ordinary skill in the relevant art having the references before him to make the proposed substitution, combination or other modification." In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016 (CCPA 1972).

Lintner, In re, 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (CCPA 1972) . . . . . . . . . .2142, 2143.01, 2144, 2144.08, 2145

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte McKellar et al HUGHES 103(a) Fish & Richardson, P.C.

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Meyer et al O’NEILL 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Allam et al McCOLLUM 102(b)/103(a) TIMOTHY S. STEVENS

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Aratani et al HAHN 103(a) FITZPATRICK, CELLA, HARPER & SCINTO

Ex Parte Geng NAPPI 103(a) RADER, FISHMAN & GRAUER PLLC

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Shaffer O’NEILL 112(2)/102(b) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) HEISLER & ASSOCIATES

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Nambu et al WARREN 102(b)/103(a) OBLON SPIVAK MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, P.C.

cf., e.g., In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 349-51 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Conspicuously missing from this record is any evidence, other than the PTO’s speculation (if it be called evidence) that one of ordinary skill in the herbicidal art would have been motivated to make the modifications of the prior art salts necessary to arrive at the claimed . . . salt.”).

Jones, In re, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992) . . . 707.07(f), 2143.01 , 2144, 2144.05, 2144.08

Ex Parte Whitlaw et al FRANKLIN 103(a) ROHM AND HAAS ELECTRIAL MATERIALS LLC

A proposed modification or combination of the prior art that would change the principle of operation of the prior art invention being modified, weighs against a conclusion of prima facie obviousness. In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959).

Ratti, In re, 270 F.2d 810, 123 USPQ 349 (CCPA 1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2143.01

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Fork et al COLAIANNI 102(b)/103(a) OLIFF & BERRIDGE, PLC.

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Wholey et al LEBOVITZ 103(a) PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP

Ex Parte Wilhelm SILVERBERG 103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Herrmann TIMM 102(e)/103(a)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Bly et al BARRETT 112(2)/103(a) RADER, FISHMAN & GRAUER PLLC

REVERSED

2400
Ex Parte Peiffer et al LUCAS SHUMAKER & SIEFFERT, P.A.

2800
Ex Parte Rougeot et al HAIRSTON ROBIC

3600
Ex Parte Dietze et al KERINS LERNER GREENBERG STEMER LLP

3700
Ex Parte Milojevic et al SILVERBERG HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.

Ex Parte Richardson et al MILLS BROOKS, CAMERON & HUEBSCH, PLLC

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700
Ex Parte Kokko OWENS GEORGIA-PACIFIC LLC

2800
Ex Parte Jang et al EASTHOM LAW OFFICES OF MIKIO ISHIMARU

3700
Ex Parte Ravikumar WALSH GORDON & JACOBSON, P.C.

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Dong et al OWENS 103(a) CANTOR COLBURN, LLP

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Gloe JEFFERY 103(a) IBM CORPORATION

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Schroeder et al HAIRSTON 103(a) AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Watatani COLAIANNI 102(b)/103(a) LEYDIG VOIT & MAYER, LTD

Ex Parte Ludwig JEFFERY 102(b)/103(a) LEE, HONG, DEGERMAN, KANG & WAIMEY

To anticipate under § 102, the prior art reference “must not only disclose all elements within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Net MoneyIn, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Thus, it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses part of the claimed invention, which an ordinary artisan might supplement to make the whole, or that it includes multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Id. at 1371. See also In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972) (“[T]he [prior art] reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.”).

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Chamberlain HORNER 103(a) W. ALLEN MARCONTELL

Ex Parte Fukumura HORNER 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Laux et al HAIRSTON 112(1)/103(a) BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Graham et al MARTIN 102(b)/103(a) DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP

Appellants concede that drawings can anticipate claims when they clearly show the structure that is claimed (citing MPEP § 2125 and In re Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069 (CCPA 1972)), but also correctly point out that drawings “cannot be relied upon for precise proportions or particular sizes of objects when the specification is silent on the matter,” citing Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, 222 F.3d 951, 55 USPQ2d 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2125

Mraz, In re, 455 F.2d 1069, 173 USPQ 25 (CCPA 1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2125

Ex Parte Marks et al WHITEHEAD, JR. 103(a) CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.

Mere lawyer's arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re GEISLER, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Geisler, In re, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . .2144.05, 2145

De Blauwe, In re, 736 F.2d 699, 222 USPQ 191 (Fed. Cir. 1984) . . . 716.01(c) , 2145

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Skibinski FETTING 112(2)/103(a) Siemens Corporation

REVERSED

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Chamberlain et al COURTENAY 112(2)/102(b)/103(a) CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP

Ex Parte Van Der Linden et al BARRY 102(e)/103(a) IBM - SAWYER LAW GROUP LLP

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Ekl et al STEPHENS 102(b)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) MOTOROLA, INC

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Lee et al CRAWFORD 102(e)/103(a) Haynes and Boone, LLP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Manjeshwar et al McCARTHY 102(b)/obviousness-type double patenting/101 112(1) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) GENERAL ELECRIC COMPANY (PCPI) C/O FLETCHER YODER

The specification underlying a “single means” claim per se fails to enable the full scope of the claim. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

By its own terms, the sixth paragraph of § 112 limits the scope only of an element in a claim for a combination. A single means claim recites a structure having only a single element, not a combination of elements. The sixth paragraph of § 112 does not limit the scope of a claim reciting a structure comprising only one element, even if the element is recited as a “means” for performing a specified function. Without the limitation provided by the sixth paragraph of § 112, the “means” recited in a single means claim encompasses any structure which might be capable of performing the specified function. Since the disclosure of any specification will be limited to those means known by the inventor, no specification can be drawn sufficiently broadly to teach how to make and use the full scope of a single means claim. Id. at 715.

Hyatt, In re, 708 F.2d 712, 218 USPQ 195(Fed. Cir. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2164.08(a), 2181